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A b s t r a c t
This document analyses the origins and consequences of debt 
accumulation in the Caribbean. The focus is placed on Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) economies. The document also examines 
current strategies for the reduction of debt.
During the second half of the 1990s, Caribbean economies 
accumulated debt on an unprecedented scale. Between 1995 and 2005 
the debt stock increased from 65 per cent to 81 per cent of GDP. Most 
economies exhibit debt-to-GDP ratios above 50 per cent and some 
(Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Jamaica, Guyana, and St. Kitts and 
Nevis) above 100 per cent. Caribbean countries are amongst some of 
the most indebted market emerging economies in the world. The debt 
issue is not a country issue but a regional one.
From the point of view of this document, the accumulation of 
debt has one overriding effect. It changes in a fundamental sense the 
role of institutions and the orientation of economic policy. They 
become agents of debt management rather than the promoters of real 
sector activities.
Most of the current analyses on the subject view debt as the 
result of government spending. The recommendation that follows 
logically is that governments should increase their primary surplus 
(which is equal to government spending minus revenue less interest 
payments). This approach is incomplete for it fails to consider an 
economy in its entirety.
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The document uses a stock-flow approach to analyze debt generation, stabilization and 
accumulation. The analysis shows that an increase in debt occurs when both the fiscal accounts and 
the external sector are in a deficit position. Alternatively this can be reformulated by stating that an 
expansion of the fiscal stance above GDP and a deterioration of the export performance ratio are 
two preconditions for the increase in debt.
Second, the analysis shows that an economy will be able to liquidate its debt over time if the 
fiscal stance is less than the export performance ratio. The economy will accumulate debt over time 
if the fiscal stance exceeds the export performance ratio. When the economy accumulates debt, the 
debt levels become eventually unsustainable.
Finally, the economy will maintain its current debt levels if the fiscal stance equals the export 
performance ratio.
The conditions derived from the stock-flow framework are validated for CARICOM 
economies. With the exception of Trinidad and Tobago, the ratio of the fiscal stance to the export 
performance ratio is positive. Moreover, those economies that exhibit the highest ratios of the fiscal 
stance to the export performance ratio are also the ones that have the highest levels of debt to GDP 
ratios.
Debt strategies such as debt restructuring or the increase in the primary surplus that do not 
take into account the relationship between the fiscal accounts and the external sector may not, 
according to the framework adopted in this document, prosper. The stock-flow framework adopted 
in this document can be used to explain the reason why countries that are continually subject to tax 
reforms and debt forgiveness proposals are not capable as a rule of eliminating budget deficits or 
substantially reduce their debt stock.
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I. I n t r o d u c t i o n
During the 1990s the public debt stock of most Caribbean economies 
increased significantly. This is especially the case of the member States 
of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) 1.
Between 1990 and 2005, the debt stock rose on average from 65 per 
cent to 84 per cent of GDP for CARICOM.2 For the OECS, the debt stock 
expanded from 75 per cent to 105 per cent of GDP between 2000 and 2005. 
Also, with the exclusion of Trinidad and Tobago, the economies that have 
witnessed a decline in their debt stock to GDP ratios (Guyana and Jamaica) 
still maintain debt levels that surpass 100 per cent of GDP.
As it stands, Caribbean economies are among the most indebted 
emerging market economies in the world. By standard criteria the debt 
levels are unsustainable.
Caribbean economies have contracted their debt mainly from 
external sources. However, in some cases, notably Barbados, Jamaica 
and St. Kitts and Nevis, countries have increasingly sought funding in 
domestic financial markets.
1 The States members o f  OECS include Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, the British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines. The analysis presented covers all member States with the exception 
o f the British Virgin Islands. These States form a currency union and fall under the monetary authority o f  the Eastern Caribbean 
Central Bank (ECCB).
2 The treaty establishing CARICOM (1973) provided for the creation o f  two distinct entities: the Caribbean Community and the 
Common Market. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has 15 member States (Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago). The Bahamas is not a member State o f the Common Market. CARICOM has five associate 
members (Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, and Turks and Caicos Islands). Aruba, Mexico, Venezuela, 
Colombia, the Netherlands Antilles, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico are observers. Six member States are considered more 
developed countries (Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago) and eight countries are considered 
less developed countries (Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines).
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Debt flows mostly take the form of multilateral and bilateral loans and supplier credit. 
However, commercial bank loans are becoming important in some economies representing up a 
quarter of total debt obligations.
The accumulation of debt has been shown to be detrimental to growth and welfare. The 
‘mainstream’ transmission channels include, among others, uncertainty, increases in the cost of 
finance, expectation of higher taxes, crowding out of public and private investment, and the effects 
of debt overhang on the rates of return.3
From the point of view of this document, the accumulation of debt has one overriding effect. 
It changes the role of institutions and the focus of economic policy in a fundamental way. Debt 
accumulation leads to a situation where debt management becomes the main objective of economic 
policy. All other objectives are rendered captive to debt management. In particular, this entails the 
separation of government from its traditional functions such as the provision of public goods and 
services. It also means the creation of a financial system for the purpose of recycling government 
paper. Ultimately, debt accumulation dissociates the financial from the productive sphere in such a 
way that the development of productive activity ceases to be the focus of economic policy.
The analysis of the generation and accumulation of debt is generally carried out using a 
budget constraint or a current account identity. The results are well known.
This first approach inevitably leads to placing the burden of the adjustment on governments. 
The government is the responsible party. Within this approach, sustainability implies that the rate of 
interest does not exceed the rate of growth of the economy and that budgets are balanced.4
Placing the focus on the external sector leads to the conclusion that debt accumulation 
depends rather on export performance. In this case, debt sustainability is achieved when the rate of 
growth of exports does not exceed the interest rate and the trade balance is in equilibrium.
When all relationships within an economy are considered and made visible and are shown to 
be consistent with one another, it becomes clear that the accumulation of debt cannot be explained 
solely by recourse to the budget constraint or the external sector, in isolation from one another. 
Rather debt is explained by their interaction and relationship. As debt accumulates, debt levels 
become eventually unsustainable.
The starting point is a monetary one. The development of smaller economies depends to a 
great extent on the acquisition of a means of payment accepted in international transactions, which 
they themselves cannot issue. Smaller economies can only build their economic infrastructure and 
develop by importing capital and raw materials as well as technology. It follows that countries must 
earn the foreign exchange required to finance their imports. In other words, they must export or, 
more to the point, their export potential must be commensurate with that of their import capacity.
3 See, Blavy, R. Public Debt and Productivity: The Difficult Quest for Growth in Jamaica. IMF Working Paper. WP/06/235. October 
2006.
4 A budget deficit is said to be unsustainable when it leads to uncontrolled increases in the public debt or when interest rates are 
perceived as being too much o f  a burden as they are imposed on taxpayers through excessive tax  rates or unequal distribution o f  the 
burden o f  the debt. W ithin the budget constraint approach the concept o f  fiscal sustainability is examined using an equation that 
relates four variables: government expenditures, government revenues, rate o f  growth of real GDP, the real interest rate and the 
outstanding public debt. More specifically the equation says that the primary budget surplus as percentage o f  GDP equals the 
difference between the real interest rate and real GDP growth multiplied by the share o f  public debt to GDP. There are several 
approaches to sustainability. Two o f the most common approaches found in the literature include the accounting approach and the 
present value constraint approach. See, Chalk, N. and Hemming R. (2000) “Assessing Fiscal Sustainability in Theory and Practice” 
IMF Working Paper 00/81.The most common practical methods to compute sustainability in the case o f  developing economies 
include: (i) the method o f  the fiscal deficit-growth gap, (ii) the financial gap method; (iii) the intertemporal budget restriction; (iv) the 
constant patrimony method; (v) the primary fiscal gap method. The sustainability approach used in this section (See Box 5) is based 
on Pasinetti (1998) and is developed in ECLAC (2000) “The fiscal impact o f trade liberalization and commodity price fluctuation: 
the Case o f the Dominican Republic, 1980-1998” (LC/MEX/R.426).
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As a result, over the long run countries must maintain equilibrium in the balance of payments 
or at least in the basic balance. Countries can only grow over the long run at rates of growth 
compatible with their external position. In this sense countries are said to be balance-of-payments 
constrained. Or to put it another way “countries’ performance in overseas markets, and the response 
of the world financial markets to this performance, constrains the rate of growth of the economy to 
a rate which is below that which internal conditions would warrant”. (McCombie and Thirlwall, 
1994).
Debt increases when the fiscal stance exceeds the limits imposed by this fundamental 
constraint. That is, governments do not spend too much or too little. Rather they over or under 
spend according to the limits imposed by the external sector. This implies that debt can increase 
because government is spending or because the performance of exports is deteriorating and net 
capital flows cannot fill the gap or due to a combination of both.
This has far-reaching policy implications. For one thing, fiscal policy objectives and targets 
have to be commensurate with the existing possibilities of the external sector. Also any fiscal 
reform that does not take into account the performance of the external sector is bound to fail. 
Finally, achieving a ‘sustainable’ debt position is a difficult task. It requires the combination and 
synchronization of short-term objectives mainly related to fiscal policy with long-term ones which 
pertain to the external sector.
The aim of this document is to present an analysis of debt by using a consistent stock-flow 
model and to apply it to the Caribbean case. In this sense, it follows in the tradition developed by 
Wynne Godley and Wynne Godley and Francis Cripps (1983).
The document is divided into four sections. The first section presents the stylized facts of 
public debt in the Caribbean. The second section sets out a standard stock-flow model. This 
framework is used to derive the conditions for debt accumulation and debt sustainability. These are 
that the fiscal stance of the government should not exceed the export performance ratio and that the 
present value should be less than its future discounted value. Section three tests these conditions to 
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II . T h e  p u b l i c  d e b t  a n d  i t s  s t y l i z e d  
f a c t s
The public debt stock in the Caribbean has, with a few exceptions 
(Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago), steadily increased in the past three 
decades especially in the case of the smaller economies of the region, 
namely in the member States of the OECS.
In the past decade the stock of outstanding debt for the larger 
sized economies has evolved, on average, from 60 per cent in 1995 to 
79 per cent of GDP in 2005. Among these, Jamaica and Guyana 
exhibit the highest indebtedness ratios (144 per cent and 140 per cent 
of GDP, respectively, for 2005).
In the case of the smaller economies the stock of debt increased 
from 26 per cent to 106 per cent of GDP for the same period. St. Kitts 
and Nevis, Dominica, and Grenada exhibit the highest debt to GDP 
ratios (173 per cent, 107 per cent and 109 per cent, respectively, for 
2005).
On closer inspection, the analysis of the available data shows 
that most countries were able to reduce or maintain roughly constant 
their debt levels in the first half of the 1990s, but that the second half 
saw unprecedented levels of expansion for all economies with the 
exception of Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. This is shown in figure 
1 on a country-by-country basis.
Trinidad and Tobago was able to reduce its debt due to the good 
performance of the oil sector which is the mainstay of the economy. 
Guyana managed to reduce its debt stock mainly as a result of the Highly 
Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative which was launched in 1996.
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According to the HIPC initiative, a country could qualify for debt relief if its GNP per capita 
was equal or less than $695 and if its debt burden was unsustainable (a net present value of the 
debt-export and debt-government revenue ratios in excess of 200-250 per cent and 280 per cent, 
respectively). The sustainability criteria were revised and reduced to 150 per cent of exports and 
250 per cent of government revenue later in 1999.5 Guyana qualified for the HIPC initiative in 2007 
and as a result its debt obligation payments (3 per cent of GDP) and interest rates (roughly 1 per 
cent) are one of the lowest in the Caribbean.
TABLE 1
SELECTED CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES 
TOTAL DEBT AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP 
1980-2005
Total debt as % of GDP





Anguilla 13.3 11.6 15.1 25.3 13.2 11.2 19.6
Antigua and Barbuda 75.4 57.9 119.7 103.4 63.8 68.7 117.6
Aruba 28.5 46.3 42.6 35.1 41.8
Barbados 10.1 62.7 43.6 71.4 74.6 34.7 68.8 83.0
Belize 51.6 84.3 19.9 68.8
Dominica 49.5 46.9 114.9 106.9 48.4 54.4 119.1
Grenada 39.7 34.7 58.2 109.4 36.7 36.1 91.7
Guyana 100.7 459.3 330.8 167.4 139.6 440.9 217.2 155.3
Jamaica 56.4 131.1 96.6 107.8 143.5 124.9 92.2 141.2
Netherlands Antilles 72.8 84.4 70.2 77.9
St. Kitts and Nevis 25.1 23.2 114.4 173.0 24.5 48.9 152.7
St. Lucia 16.9 20.7 40.5 65.1 19.1 25.1 56.3
St. Vincent and 
Grenadines 28.1 33.5 70.0 78.7 31.6 40.8 73.9
Suriname 54.3 22.4 9.0 35.7
The Bahamas 8.2 29.0 43.6 37.6 46.2 40.5 41.7 42.0
Trinidad and Tobago 10.2 34.2 20.6 8.9 5.7 26.5 15.2
Average 64.8 71.6 82.0 71.3 54.1 80.7
Average OECS a/ 25.8 75.0 105.6 25.1 38.3 94.3
Average CARICOM 64.8 74.5 84.4 73.7 54.3 83.7
Average CARICOM b/ 40.6 67.4 80.1 40.3 41.8 78.2
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official information.
Note: a/Includes data for domestic debt from 2000 to 2005 for the OECS. b/ Excludes Guyana.
5 The HIPC initiative granted debt relief to the ‘w orld’s poorest and most indebted countries to reduce the constraint on economic 
growth and poverty reduction.’ The HIPC initiative granted debt relief after a three year proven reform record. In 1999, developed 
countries introduced the enhanced HIPC which besides lowering the sustainability threshold also provides greater debt relief and 
access to it. Currently 28 countries benefit from the HIPC initiative.
1 2
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STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC DEBT AND DEBT INDICATORS (SELECTED COUNTRIES), 2005
In percentage



















Multilateral 4.5 22.0 32.4 22.3 61.2 30.2 89.0 23.9 34.7 53.0 36.3 14.7
Bilateral 14.5 1.2 16.0 19.1 16.2 9.3 14.8 12.0 7.8 13.7 83.9
Commercial 20.6 78.0 64.6 61.4 17.7 0.4 1.0 61.3 32.2 39.1 43.6
Export credit 6.3 0.5 0.2 0.0 1.7
Other 60.3 1.8 0.3 2.0 53.1 0.8 21.1 0.0 6.4 1.4
Domestic debt
Government securities 19.1 95.5 88.4 50.0 99.0 80.6 76.6 47.9 100
Bank loans 28.6 0.5 0.5 50.0 1.0 2.1 8.1 30.9
Unpaid contributions 37.8
Supplier credits 7.8
Other 11.7 4.0 11.2 21.5 15.3 21.2
External debt service/GDP 3.5 3.7 19.4 3.4 1.8 3.1 9.1 9.8 4.3 4.5 1.9
External debt service/Exports 6.1 2.8 9.9 56.0 7.9 5.3 14.4 22.2 7.0 10.7 2.3
External debt service/Revenue 168.4 1.9 11.4 81.2 10.5 6.5 8.7 20.4 16.8 17.0 7.1
Domestic debt service/ GDP 2.1 1.9 27.5
Domestic debt service/Revenue 4.5 5.3 98.1
Domestic debt/total debt 65.4 71.3 63.9 13.0 34.3 26.4 23.5 58.0 63.6 35.2 29.9 52.7
Effective average interest rate
Domestic debt 5.5 81.4 98.8 36.9
External debt 3.2 5.4 6.6 31.2 1.9 0.8 36.6 38.0 6.8 5.4 3.4 7.1
Interest payments/ Revenue
Domestic 6.9 8.9 3.7 3.1 8.8 5.2 36.7 10.3 3.7 4.8
External 11.2 1.9 5.6 26.2 7.1 7.7 7.7 12.8 11.2 8.5 6.0 6.5
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With a few exceptions (notably Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica and St. Kitts and Nevis) the 
debt is mainly financed from external sources, that is, public debt is equivalent to external debt. 
According to the available information, the bulk of the external debt is held by the central 
government representing more than 80 per cent of the total (see charts in Annex 1 for the case of the 
OECS).6
The decomposition of external debt by creditor category shows that multilateral sources are 
the main source of debt finance. However, their importance has declined over time. On average 
OECS member States financed more than half of their public debt through multilateral institutions 
in 1990, and roughly a third in 2005. Bilateral sources have also lost importance (26 per cent and 
14 per cent of the total in 1990 and 2005). Contrarily, commercial banks have gained (4 per cent 
and 26 per cent of the total in the same period).
For the OECS member States, where the data is available, the rise in importance of 
commercial banks as a source of finance closely coincides with the increase in interest payments 
and in debt accumulation. The correlation coefficient between both is statistically significant. This 
may indicate the fact that economies with higher debt levels have a higher risk of default and thus 
pay a higher risk premium. As well, the greater the risk premium the greater the debt stock. The 
feedback between debt stock levels and interest rates is obviously conducive to a financial ‘Ponzi’ 
type regime.
Indebted countries turn to commercial creditors to seek alternative sources of finance, when 
these cannot or are not willing to comply with the austerity conditions required by international 
institutions to act as lender of last resort and capital markets are liberalized.7 In the absence of a 
global currency for settling all transactions, countries that do not issue the international reserve 
currency must be able to offer marketable assets in order to secure loans. The marketability of a 
country’s assets can be determined by their ability to pay in terms of the net present value of future 
net foreign exchange earnings or its foreign reserve position. The OECS complies with this 
requirement. It has a currency that is backed by a reserve ratio reaching 80 per cent of its liabilities.
6 The decomposition o f  total debt by borrower category is not available in the cases o f  the Bahamas, Belize, Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad 
and Tobago and Suriname. The Bahamas and Belize provide data for the decomposition o f  public sector debt. In both cases, the 
central government accounts for 85 per cent and 95 per cent o f total public debt.
7 The positive relationship between the liberalization o f capital flows and commercial bank lending to governments is noted by 
Nissanke and Stein (2002). Commercial banks provide short-term loans. Multilateral institutions provide medium-to long-term loans. 
The former requires liquidity to secure loans. The latter assumes the country’s ability to pay. In this sense Arestis et Al. (2005, p.521)
write: “the IM F... has to raise loans from the international m arket The IMF acts as the guarantor that that these countries will
meet the international creditor’s dem and.. ..the IMF has to set conditions that comply with international creditor’s demand, and these 
conditions act as the credit standard against which the international loans are issues.” As it will become clear the main credit standard 
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As indicated previously, not all economies have turned to external sources in order to finance 
their debt. The Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica and St. Kitts and Nevis have made explicit attempts to 
finance their debt from internal sources and in fact the stock of domestic debt represents more than 
50 per cent of the total. This is shown in figure 2 for Barbados, Jamaica, and St. Kitts and Nevis.
FIGURE 2
DOMESTIC DEBT AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL, 1990-2005
0 -I 1--------1-------- 1--------1--------1--------1--------1-------- 1--------1--------1--------1--------1-------- 1--------1--------1
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
— * — Barbados - - Jamaica — ■— St. Kitts and Nevis
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data.
For Jamaica, at the end of 2005, the domestic debt stock was held mainly in short-term 
instruments (82 per cent of the total with a 1-5 years maturity profile) denominated in local currency 
(73 per cent of the total). Moreover, more than half of the domestic debt instruments had a variable 
interest rate. Contrarily, in the case of Barbados, the domestic debt is held in long-term instruments 
with a fixed rate denominated in domestic currency (see table 2).
In the case of the OECS, domestic debt consists of treasury bills and commercial bank loans (30 
per cent and 40 per cent on average). Also in the case of Antigua and Barbuda unpaid contributions 
represent an important part of the domestic stock. Treasury bills are placed in the Regional 
Government Securities Market (see table 2).
The rise in the stock of debt has been accompanied by an upward trend in debt service
payments particularly for Belize and the OECS.
In the case of the OECS, debt service payments represented on average 2 per cent and 3 per cent 
of GDP; 13 per cent and 35 per cent of exports in 1990 and 2005, respectively. The decomposition of 
the debt service into interest payments and principal shows that the former accounts for the bulk of the 
increase (see figure 3 below). Interest rate payments increased roughly around the period that 
commercial banks began to play an important role as creditors to the OECS governments. For Belize, 
the rise in interest payments is accounted for by the evolution of the principal.
Contrarily in the cases of the Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica and Guyana, debt service payments
declined. This responded to the HIPC initiative in the case of Guyana and to adjustment efforts in the cases 
of the Bahamas, Barbados, and Jamaica that date to the beginning of the 1990s (see Annex for a 
description of the stabilization packages implemented in the Caribbean).
The decomposition of the debt service into its different components shows a reduction in amortization 
and interest rate payments. In the case of Jamaica interest payments as a percentage of exports of goods and 
services declined from 13 per cent in 1990 to five per cent in 1993 and have remained around that level.
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FIGURE 3 
OECS
EXTERNAL DEBT STOCK AND PAYMENTS ON INTEREST AND PRINCIPAL
1990-2005
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
—■— Interest to GDP Principal to GDP Debt stock
Source: Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (2006)
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III.  T h e  g e n e r a t i o n  a n d  a c c u m u l a t i o n  
o f  d e b t :  A  s t o c k - f l o w  a p p r o a c h
A. The stock-flow framework
The generation and accumulation of debt can be shown to occur using a 
standard stock flow model. Building on the previous analysis, this section 
presents a stock-flow framework that outlines the basic macroeconomic 
relations in an economy.
This section builds and draws heavily from the work of Godley 
(1983, 1999, 2000, 2001), Izurieta (2001) and Lavoie (2001) and 
Backus et al. (1980). The framework is presented in the form of stock- 
flow matrices that incorporate transaction among different agents (that 
is, flows) and their corresponding balance sheet holding gains or losses 
(that is, stocks). The rows of the matrices represent money transactions 
among agents for each good, service or asset considered in the model. 
A negative sign in a row signifies a source of expenditure and a 
positive sign a destination of expenditure. As a result, as Godley 
(1999, p. 394) points out “every flow comes from somewhere and goes 
somewhere.” Thus to provide a consistent macroeconomic framework 
all rows must sum up to zero. The columns are defined by the sectors 
or agents considered in the model and represent their budget constraint. 
For this reason, they must also sum up to zero. The counterpart of the 
budget constraint of each sector is the generation of changes in stocks 
of assets and liabilities. These appear as changes in agents’ balance 
sheets.
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The stock-flow framework has several characteristics worth detailing. First, it is a consistency 
framework and thus does not require satisfying particular “ex ante”equilibrium conditions. Second, 
as pointed by Backus et al. (1980), the money flows of goods, services and assets refer to sales and 
purchases during a discrete period of time (a quarter or a year). In this sense, the construction of the 
matrix allows for the introduction in a given period of patterns of evolutionary change. That is, it is 
an open system (Dow and Chick, 2002). From the reasoning underlying both these reasons, it 
follows that the framework does not impose an excessive burden on deductive reasoning, but rather 
seeks to highlight the compatibility of defined configurations of transactions Godley (1983, p. 44).
The institutional and behavioral workings of the stock-flow framework model built on the 
analysis of the previous sections are as follows. The stock-flow framework is divided in three sub­
matrices. The first shows the money transactions (a minus sign indicates the origin of a monetary 
flow and a plus sign the expenditure) of the economic agents. Their sum of rows is equal to zero. 
The second sub-matrix represents the flow of funds (or savings), which is the counterpart of the 
transactions matrix. The columns of the transactions and flow balances sum up to zero. The third 
sub-matrix is a stock matrix. It shows the balance sheets of the agents (or their accumulation 
accounts).
The framework considers one country, say country A, and the rest of the world (i.e., external 
sector). The country in question comprises, in turn, four agents’ households, firms, government and 
commercial banks. Following (Tobin (1969 and Godley, 1999) the framework treats the capital and 
current account separately for firms. The capital account includes assets and debts and the current 
account production and income flows.8
Because the internal capital market is not developed and is restricted, the framework 
considers only loans and money in the form of deposits in the capital account for commercial bank 
(as an example, demand deposits (DDd) and commercial bank loans (Lb)). In the case of firms the 
capital account includes demand for investment (INV). The framework also includes a Central Bank 
which is part of the government.
The Central Bank is assumed to maintain a passive policy satisfying the demand for base 
money at a given rate of interest through the variation of its international reserve holdings. That is, 
money supply is endogenous. This appears clearly in the capital account of the flow balances of the 
central bank. Changes in commercial banks deposits (DDa) are validated by changes in the money 
base (HP) through variations in foreign assets (Fg).
Commercial banks pay interest on deposits from households and firms (rdDh and rdDf) and 
charge interest to businesses and households (rlf and rlh). The framework assumes an interest rate 
spread, which constitute the profits of the bank which then are distributed to households as 
dividends (-DIVh). In other words there are no retained profits and the flow of funds of the 
commercial banks sum to zero.
The economic activity of households is limited to consumption (C). Households receive 
wages (W) and profits and dividends from households and banks (+ n a f  +DIVh). That is, firms’ 
and banks’ profits are distributed to households. Taking into account our previous analysis of bank 
loans in the Union, households also receive interest income on their deposits and pay interest on 
their loans (-rlh). Thus firms’ and banks’ money income earnings flow back to households.
The counterpart of households’ earnings and payments are their money holdings which are 
deposited back in the commercial bank system (DHP) due to the lack of a developed capital market 
(see, the sub-matrix of flow balances in table 3 below). The banking system satisfies passively the
8 In table 3, the negative and positive signs in the transactions matrix represent the origin (payment) and destination (receipt) o f money 
flows. In the flow of funds matrix, the negative and positive signs denote the uses and sources o f  funds, respectively.
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demand for loans. Within this diagram, money flows can be seen as completing a “circuit” from the 
time a decision is made to finance production or consumption.
Firms distribute profits and pay wages to households and firms and supply and demand 
investment (INV), export and import to and from the rest of the world (-M and +X), and pay taxes 
to the government (rf) and interest on their loans to commercial banks (-rlf). Firms also receive 
transfers from the government.
The government spends and taxes (G and r). Following the analysis of earlier sections the 
government has a deficit (FBg), which is financed with the issue of treasury bills and foreign assets 
on which it pays interest.
The rest of the world is characterized in terms of its commercial and capital flow relations 
(exports (X), imports (M) and private and official capital flows (denoted by Deq). The exports (X) 
are necessarily equal to the imports of the rest of the world. The country in question pays also 






Capital Banks Government External
Sector
I
C -C +C 0
I -INV +INV 0
G +G -G 0
M -M +M +M 0
X +X -X -X 0
T -Th -Tf -Tt 0
W +W -W 0
rlb -rlb -rlf -rl
rtb +rtb -rtb +rtb 0
rd +rdDh +rdDf -rDt 0
Dividends +np+nb -np -nb +nfs
FB FBh FBf FBg -CAB 0
Flow of funds
Cash -DHP -DHP -DHP 0
Demand deposits -DDd + DDd 0
Time deposits DTd + DTd 0
Treasury bills -DTb + DTb -DTb 0
Loans + DLf -DLb 0
Capital -Deq +Deq + Deq -Deq 0
I 0 0 0 0 0
Balance sheet matrix
Cash +HD -HP -HP 0
Demand deposits +Dd -Dd 0
Time deposits +Td -Td 0
Treasury bills +TB -TB 0
Loans -Lf +Lf 0
Capital + m _Q -Eq 0
Foreign assets +Fg -Fg 0
Source: Towards a reconstruction of Macroeconomics using a stock flow consistent (SFC) Model by Wynne Godley, 
Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance. University of Cambridge, May 2004.
Monetary Economics, An Integrated Approach to Credit, Money, Income, Production and Wealth by Wynne Godley and Marc 
Lavoie. Ny : Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.
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With the use of the first and second matrix, the financial balances or savings (the difference 
between income and expenditure) can be reproduced as follows,
(1)
FBh = W + rdDh - C -  Th -  rhl + n
FBb = n  -  Tb -  rbl 
FBg = T -  Cg -  rtb -  er*l*g 
FBfs = rl + rtb -  rDt - n  
FBes = e(M + r*l*g + n  - E)
The financial balances are in turn equal to the transactions in financial assets. In other words 
the next step is to specify the form in which these financial assets are held, i.e., the flow-of-funds 
accounts. Formally,
(2)
FBh = AMh - ADDh -  ADDeq 
FBb = pAKb -  ADb (i.e., DLf)
FBg = AMh - ADg -  eAD*g (i.e., DTB)
FBfs = AMh - (ADb + ADg) -  eAR* = 0 
FBes = Deq -  e(AD*g) + eAR*
From the set of Eqs.(1)-(2) it can be seen that debt appears in the flow of funds accounts in 
the household, business, government and external sectors. External debt appears in the government 
flow of funds accounts and at the same time in the balance of payment accounts.
Debt is, thus, not due to the behavior of one agent or sector but results from the interaction 
and relationships among all agents and sectors. Any analysis of debt must therefore incorporate 
explicitly their behavior and interrelation.
B. The analysis of debt
The starting point for this analysis is that of a full steady state. In a full steady state or stationary 
equilibrium, all stock and flow variables are constant (full equilibrium). In the case of a closed 
economy this means that the government budget must be in balance. In other words, the 
government’s financial balance must be equal to zero,
(3) FBg =0,
In the case of an open economy, this condition also applies to the external sector. That is, a 
full steady state in an open economy requires that the fiscal accounts and the external sector are 
balanced. That is,
(4) FBg = 0 and FBes =0;
In a case where stock variables are constant (i.e, dSt/dt =0) but flow variables can change, 
equilibrium requires that the budget deficit be equal to the external sector deficit. In other words,
(3) FBg = FBe
As pointed by Oates (1966, p.493) in such a situation the stock of net financial assets is equal 
to zero and ‘whatever financial assets are being injected into the system by the budget deficit are 
simultaneously drained out by the deficit in the trade balance.” It follows that from Eq.(3) the level 
of income equals to,
(4) FBg = FBe «  Cg -  T = M - X
2 2
E C L A C  -  Studies and  Perspectives series -  The C aribbean  -  No. 5 D ebt accum ulation  in  the  C aribbean
Assuming that the government’s income and imports depend on income, it can be shown that,
(5) FBg = FBe O  Cg -  ty = my -  X O  Cg + x = my + ty O  y = (Cg + X)/(t + m)
The derived expression in Eq(5) is termed the Augmented Fiscal Stance (AFS). It determines 
the level of income coexistent with stock equilibrium. This level is dependent on government 
expenditure and the average tax rate and on exports and the average propensity to import.
Eqs. (4) and (5) can be used to derive the conditions for the generation and accumulation of 
debt. This task is undertaken in the following section using as a starting point the budget constraint 
as is customary in the literature on the subject. The analysis can be undertaken as well using the 
external sector as a starting point. Ultimately, as the section on the adoption of a quasi steady State 
implies, the budget and external sector constraints are affected by the same variables.
C. The generation and accumulation of debt
The budget constraint states that the difference between government expenditure and income must 
be ‘financed’ by debt or the issue of fiduciary currency. That is,
(6) Cg -  Tg +(1+it)Dt_! + (1+ rt)D*t-1 = Dt + D*t 
Where,
Cg = government consumption 
Tg = government taxes
it = interest rate on the domestic currency denominated debt 
rt = interest rate on the foreign currency denominated debt 
Dt = stock of domestic debt 
D*t = stock of foreign debt
Assuming that uncovered interest rate parity holds, Eq.(6) can be expressed as,
(7) Bt = (1+r) Bt_! + (Cg -  T)
Where,
Bt = Dt + D*t
Taking into account that tax revenue is a function of income (T = 0y), that the level of 
income is given by the quasi steady state Eq. Developed in the previous section, Eq.(7) becomes,
(8) Bt = (1+r) Bn + (Cg -  0(G+X)/(0+m))
The variables in Eq(8) can be standardized in relation to income with the help of simple 
algebra. That is,
(9) Bt/PtYt = (1+r) (Bt . t/PtYt) + (Cg -  0(G+X)/(0+m)) (1/PtYt)
Further manipulation yields,
(10) ( .̂gt -  0x) + (m + 0) (1+ r - n -  yt) bM = bt (m + 0)
From Eq. (10) it can be easily seen that the government is able to meet is debt if the limit of 
the mathematical expectation of the debt is equal to 0 as t tends to infinity.
(11) lim E(bt (m + 0)) = 0 <=> (m + 0) lim E(bt) =0
t -> M
Two necessary and sufficient conditions satisfy Eq.(11). These are,:
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(12)
(qgt -  0x) < 0 O  qgt < 0x O  Gt/0 < X/q
and
r - n -  yt >0 O  r < yt + n O  r < (Yt-Yt.i)/Yt_i
O  r < ((Yt/Yt.j) -1) O  Yt > (1+rt)/Yt_1 O  YM<Y,/(1+rt)
The analysis developed indicates three important facts relating to debt generation, 
stabilization and accumulation.
First, an increase in debt occurs when both the fiscal accounts and the external sector are in a 
deficit position. Alternatively this can be reformulated by stating that an expansion of the fiscal 
stance above GDP and a deterioration of the export performance ratio are two preconditions for the 
increase in debt.
As stated earlier, the fiscal stance is defined as government expenditure divided by the tax 
ratio (tax revenue over GDP). Formally,
(13) FS = G / (T/GDP)
Where,
FS = fiscal stance.
G = government revenue.
T = total tax revenue.
GDP = Gross Domestic Product.
When the fiscal stance is neutral, that is when tax revenue covers government expenditure, 
G=T and the fiscal stance is equal to GDP (FS=GDP). The fiscal stance is said to be expansionary 
when G>T and FS>GDP. It is restrictive if G<T and FS<GDP.
For its part, the export performance ratio is measured by the ratio of exports to the average 
propensity of import (i.e. the ratio of imports to GDP). Formally,
(14) EPR = X/(M/GDP)
Where,
EPR = export performance ratio.
X = exports of goods and services.
M = imports of goods and services.
GDP = Gross Domestic Product.
When exports are equal to imports, the export performance ratio is equal to GDP 
(EPR=GDP). Export performance will improve when X>M and EPR>GDP. The export will 
deteriorate when X<M and EPR<GDP.
The fiscal stance and the export performance ratio can be computed in terms of percent 
deviation from GDP. A value of zero would indicate a state of external (fiscal) equilibrium. A 
value greater than zero in percentage shows the percent deviation of the fiscal and external accounts 
from their equilibrium positions.
A positive (negative) deviation for the fiscal stance determines the extent to which it is 
expansionary (contractive) relative to a balanced position. Contrarily a positive (negative) deviation 
for the export performance ratio shows the extent to which the surplus (deficit) in the current 
account exceeds its balanced position.
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Second the analysis shows that an economy will be able to liquidate its debt over time if the 
fiscal stance is less than to the export performance ratio. The economy will accumulate debt over 
time if the fiscal stance exceeds the export performance ratio. Finally, the economy will maintain its 
current debt levels if the fiscal stance equals the export performance ratio.
Third, the analysis shows that an economy will exhibit sustainable debt levels if the rate of 
interest is less than the rate of growth of output. In other words the future streams of income flows 
must exceed the present ones by value of the interest payments of that income flow. From the point 
of view of this document, unsustainability follows from debt accumulation. As a result, the first 
condition is the crucial one.
It is important to note that these conditions could have been derived as well by starting from 
the financial balance for the external sector. As stated by Eq. (5) above in a quasi steady state the 
government and external sector balances are equal. The change in perspective would not modify the 
conclusions regarding the conditions for debt stabilization stated in this section.
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IV .  T e s t i n g  f o r  t h e  s t o c k - f l o w  d e b t  
c o n d i t i o n s
A. The evolution of the fiscal stance
In the case of most Caribbean countries the fiscal stance (FS) has been 
expansionary throughout the 1990s, as the FS has always surpassed GDP 
(see figure 5). Moreover it has been increasingly expansionary throughout 
most of the latter half of the 1990s.
All countries, with the exception of Antigua and Barbuda, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, adopted an 
increasingly expansionary fiscal stance roughly close to the second 
half of the 1990s (see figure 4 below). Antigua and Barbuda, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines increased their fiscal 
stance in the middle of the 1980s. Further, all countries witnessed an 
acceleration of the fiscal stance towards the end of the 1990s.
The behavior of the fiscal stance was mainly driven by 
government expenditures as the taxation levels, with independence of 
some of the reforms adopted, remained with a few exceptions, 
constant. The behavior of the fiscal stance was sustained in most cases 
by increases in both current and capital expenditures.
2 7
E C L A C  -  Studies and  Perspectives series -  The C aribbean  -  No. 5 D ebt accum ulation  in  the  C aribbean
Capital expenditures played an important role in the cases of Belize, Dominica, Grenada, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. In these cases the government opted to 
expand capital expenditures as a policy decision to boost aggregate demand and growth.9
It should also be taken into account that St. Kitts and Nevis’ increased capital expenditure 
also responded to recovery and reconstruction outlays to offset the damage inflicted to the economy 
by Hurricanes Luis and Marilyn (1995) and Georges (1998). For its part, Dominica’s development 
of capital expenditure increased as part of a policy of structural adjustment and change.
FIGURE 4





9 St. Vincent and the Grenadines embarked on a series o f infrastructure projects during the late 1990s including the Canouan Airport, 
the central highway, a vegetable market and banana irrigation. See, WTO, TPR, SVT, 2001.
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(g) Suriname
Years
(h) Trinidad and Tobago
Years
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data.
Current expenditures played a significant role in Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Kitts 
and Nevis and St. Vincent and the Grenadines in the case of the OECS and in Barbados, Guyana 
and Jamaica.
In the case of Antigua and Barbuda, interest payments on the stock of debt which began to 
cumulate in 1996 were the main factor behind the rise in current revenues and indeed of the fiscal 
position of the government. Interest rate payments widened the fiscal disequilibrium and fed into 
the debt stock, in turn the higher the debt stock the larger the interest payments.
A similar story can be told in the case of Dominica, with the difference that in this case 
capital expenditures to transform and diversify the economy resulted in a higher debt stock, interest 
payments and hence current revenues.
St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Vincent and the Grenadines’ current expenditures were driven by 
increases in the wage bill.10
10 St. Kitts and Nevis current expenditures also responded to expenses related to the St. Kitts Sugar Manufacturing Corporation, and the 
duplication of government services. Also, available information indicates that in the late 1990s the government increased public 
sector wages by 10%.
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Barbados’ expansionary fiscal stance is explained by a reduction in tax revenues lasting from 
1996 to 2000, and the rise in current expenditures thereafter. The reduction in tax revenues 
coincides with the introduction of the value added tax in 1997. The rise in current expenditures is 
mainly attributed to higher wages meant to compensate for salary cuts that took place a decade 
earlier.11
In the case of Jamaica, the rise in current expenditures was associated with the expansion in 
nominal wages to counteract the effect of rising prices on public servants’ purchasing power. The 
rise in debt service payments also contributed to the overall result.
Finally Guyana’s fiscal performance was determined by transfers to State-owned firms and 
higher than expected utility costs.
B. The evolution of the export performance ratio
At the same time as the fiscal stance expanded, the current account position of Caribbean countries 
deteriorated (see figure 7). In fact the current account started to deteriorate at the same time that the 
fiscal stance became expansionary. On average the current account deficit increased from 11 per 
cent of GDP in 1991 to -18 per cent in 2005.
In the case of the OECS, the current account deficit increased significantly in the second half 
of the 1990s due both to the deterioration of export performance and the increase in imports. 
Exports of goods and services declined steadily from 66 per cent of GDP in 1992 to 63 per cent in 
1995 and 54 per cent in 2005. Imports of goods and services rose from 74 per cent of GDP in 1992 
to 75 per cent in 1995 and to 66 per cent in 2005.
For Barbados, the current account deteriorated from -1.4 per cent to -8 per cent of GDP 
between 1991 and 2005. Imports as a percentage of GDP exhibited an upward trend during the 
1990s (43 per cent and 57 per cent in 1992 and 2001). Exports rose between 1991 and 1996 from 49 
per cent to 61 per cent of GDP and declined thereafter to 53 per cent in 2005.
In the case of Belize the current account widened from -7 per cent to -18 per cent of GDP, 
between 1991 and 2005. Exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP declined steadily 
from 68 per cent to 54 per cent between 1991 and 2003. For their part imports decreased from 80 
per cent to 57 per cent between 1991 and 1998, and then reversed its trend increasing to 67 per cent 
in 2005.
Guyana witnessed a steady decline of both exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. 
Between 1992 and 2001, exports and imports of goods and services decreased from 151 per cent 
and 180 per cent to 115 per cent and 133 per cent of GDP, respectively. The behavior of the current 
account in the case of Guyana is atypical in relation to the rest of the Caribbean countries since the 
country managed to actually reduce its current account deficit which had reached levels above 40 
per cent of GDP in the late 1980s and early 1990s due to the prevailing dire economic conditions.
In the case of Jamaica the current account result deteriorated from 0.7 per cent to -10 per cent 
of GDP between 1992 and 2005. As in the case of some of the other countries, Jamaica also
11 In 1991 Barbados implemented a stabilization package centered on restraining the growth of aggregate demand in order to reduce the 
pressure on the balance o f  payments. Demand was curbed by monetary and fiscal means. On the fiscal expenditure side nominal 
wages were cut and frozen and public employment reduced. On the revenue side a surtax, termed the “stabilization tax”, was 
introduced in addition to consumption taxes and levies and at the same time the authorities reduced the rate o f CARICOM ’s common 
external tariff. The Valued Added Tax was introduced on 1 January 1997. It replaced 11 taxes including a consumption tax, a stamp 
duty tax, and surcharges. The VAT included a number o f  tax exempted items. According to Howard (2001, p234) the Barbados 
Government projected a fall in the revenue yield as a consequence o f the introduction o f the VAT. The ‘strengthening’ o f  social 
expenditures has been one o f  the policy development goals o f  Barbados since the 1960s (see Downes, 2001, Williams, 2001). Social 
expenditures represented a third o f government total expenditure in 1960 increasing to half o f  the total in 1998.
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experienced both a decline in exports and imports expressed as a percentage of GDP, with the 
former far out pacing the latter (45 per cent and 62 per cent in 1991; 94 per cent and 97 per cent in 
2005).
Contrarily Trinidad and Tobago increased its current account surplus from 3 per cent to 9 per 
cent of GDP between 1993 and 2003. The country saw an increase in both exports and imports of 
goods and services (42 per cent and 32 per cent of GDP in 1993; 54 per cent and 44 per cent of 
GDP in 2001, respectively).
The deterioration of the current account is captured by the decline in the export performance 
ratio. This measure was obtained for each CARICOM economy. Eye inspection of figures 6,7 and 8 
show that, the export performance ratio remained roughly stable in the first part of the decade and 
deteriorated in the second half.
As has been stated in several documents produced by the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the worsening of CARICOM’s export performance is 
reflected in the loss of market share in its major export markets both in goods and tourist services. 
Between 1985 and 2002, the export market share of Caribbean countries in regional trading blocs, 
such as the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU) 
(Western Europe), has decreased from 0.71 per cent to 0.27 per cent and from 0.15 per cent to 0.10 
per cent, respectively.
It is also noteworthy to indicate that the deterioration in export performance reflects both the 
goods and services sector. Figure 8 shows the rate of growth in export services in real terms for 
Caribbean economies on average from 1982 to 2004. The figure shows a visible declining trend.
FIGURE 5
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FIGURE 6
EXPORT PERFORMANCE RATIO FOR CARICOM ECONOMIES 
IN PERCENTAGE DEVIATION FROM GDP, 1990-2005
 EPR with Trinidad and T obago----- EPR without T rinidad and T obago
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official information
FIGURE 7
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(g) Suriname
Years
(h) Trinidad and Tobago
Years
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data.
FIGURE 8
RATE OF GROWTH IN EXPORT SERVICES IN REAL TERMS 
AVERAGE FOR CARICOM (1981-2004)
Years
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official information.
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C. The relationship between the fiscal stance and the export 
performance ratio
The fiscal stance has exceeded the export performance ratio for all economies with the exception of 
Trinidad and Tobago. This is shown is figure 9 which plots the ratio of the average fiscal stance to 
the export performance ratio for CARICOM economies for which data is available for two periods 
1990-1997 and 1997-2005.
The figure shows that for both periods under consideration, and in all cases considered, the 
ratio is greater than one. In other words the fiscal stance has surpassed the export performance ratio. 
Thus the conditions for debt accumulation have been present since the beginning of the decade.
Also the figure shows that the ratio is greater for those countries that have the highest debt 
stocks to GDP ratios, Guyana and Jamaica followed by St. Kitts and Nevis. Finally as shown in 
figure 9, the ratio of the fiscal stance to the debt stock as a percentage of GDP is greater for most 
economies for the second period under consideration, that is for the ‘debt accumulation period.’
This hypothesis is validated more generally for all CARICOM economies through a simple 
cross-sectional regression for the ‘debt accumulation period (1997-2005) (see figure 10 below). 
Figure 10 also shows that the relationship between the debt-to-GDP ratio and the ratio of the fiscal 
stance is positive. The adjusted R2 is equal to 0.57 and the coefficient is positive (0.21) and 
significant at the 95 per cent level of confidence (the t statistic is 3.79 which is greater than the 1.65 
critical value).
FIGURE 9
RATIO OF FISCAL STANCE TO EXPORT PERFORMANCE FOR CARICOM ECONOMIES
LOGARITHMIC SCALE
Countries
■  Average 1990-1997 ■ Average 1997-2005
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official information.
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FIGURE 10
















Source: Author's own computations. They are the result of a model.
D. The sustainability condition
The second condition derived from the stock-flow model is that in order for an economy to stabilize 
its debt levels, the rate of growth of output must be greater than the rate of interest. As shown in 
figures 11 and 12 below, countries for which data is available complied with the sustainability 
condition during the period 1990-1997. However, during the second period, ‘the debt accumulation 
period’, the opposite phenomenon occurs. The rate of interest exceeds the rate of growth of output 
and as a result the debt levels have become unsustainable.
FIGURE 11






□  Growth GDP □  Implicit nterest rates















E C L A C  -  Studies and  Perspectives series -  The C aribbean  -  No. 5 D ebt accum ulation  in  the  C aribbean
FIGURE 12
DEBT SUSTAINABILITY CONDITIONS FOR THE OECS (1991-1997)
7 -|
AB DO GRE SK SV SL
Countries
■  Growth GDP ■  Implicit interest rates 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official information.
FIGURE13
DEBT STOCK AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP AND GROWTH OF GDP PER CAPITA
1997-2005
Rate of growth
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official information.
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V .  D e b t  a c c u m u l a t i o n :
c o n s e q u e n c e s  a n d  s t r a t e g i e s
A. The implications of debt accumulation
Debt accumulation cannot proceed on an impending scale. Highly 
indebted countries are exposed to higher risk premia, currency instability, 
financial fragility, and lower levels of investment and growth.
Figure 13 above captures the inverse relationship between debt 
accumulation and real GDP per capita growth through a scatter plot 
and regression analysis. The relationship between both variables is 
negative, indicating that an increase in the debt stock measured as a 
percentage of GDP is inversely related to GDP per capita growth. The 
regression analysis yields an adjusted R2 of 0.32 and a statistically 
significant coefficient of -0.03. That is, when the debt stock to GDP 
ratio increases by 1 per cent, the GDP per capita growth declines by - 
0.3 per cent.
The transmission channels through which debt accumulation 
affects growth performance include, among others, uncertainty, 
increases in the cost of finance, expectation of higher taxes, crowding 
out of public and private investment, and the effects of debt overhang 
on rates of return.
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It also has been argued that the structure of output is also a reinforcing factor of the effects of 
debt on economic growth. Low levels of diversification, higher levels of concentration of 
production in enclaves with little spillovers to the rest of the economy and a larger sized informal 
economy are also characteristics that render an economy more vulnerable to the detrimental effects 
of debt on growth.12
From the point of view of this document, the accumulation of debt has a more important 
effect. It changes in a fundamental sense the role of institutions and the direction of economic 
policy. Under conditions of accumulating debt, debt management becomes the overriding goal of 
institutions and of economic policy. All other objectives are subsumed and actually become captive 
to the debt management objective.
In the Caribbean there are three manifestations of this phenomenon which can be illustrated 
mostly with the case of Jamaica. The first is that the government’s role is divorced from the 
provision of public goods and services and from functional finance. The government spends its 
resources in managing its debt.
Figure 14 below shows that expenditures related to debt management grew from 40 per cent 
to more than 60 per cent of the total between 1988 and 2005. During the same period the combined 
expenditures for education, health, housing and water supplies declined from 20 per cent to 14 per 
cent of the total. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2006) shows that public investment 
represented 25 per cent of the total in 1988, and less than 5 per cent in 2005.
FIGURE 14
FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF SELECTED GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
(1988/89-2004/05)






12 See, B lavy  (2006).
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Second, the financial sector ceases to be the provider of liquidity to the private sector. The 
financial system recycles debt and invests in government paper. As pointed out earlier, commercial 
banks have become one of the main sources of finance for the governments of the OECS 
representing in some cases a quarter of the total. In the case of Jamaica, the commercial banking 
system holds most (roughly more than 40 per cent of the total) of its investment in Treasury Bills 
and government debentures.
Third, when the domestic component of the debt stock is important, as in the case of 
Barbados or Jamaica, monetary policy can easily be driven by the needs of fiscal policy. 13In the 
case of Jamaica the decline in central bank interest rates translates in a commensurate decline in 
government yields which lessens the burden of interest payments. Figure 15 shows the evolution 
and correlation coefficient between central bank and Treasury Bill and government interest rate 
payments.14
FIGURE 15
JAMAICA: REPO AND TREASURY BILL RATES AND NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE
1996-2005
Years
Repo T Bills —■—Exchange rate
Source: Statistical digest, BOJ several issues.
This has important implications for monetary policy. For one thing, the authorities are 
compelled to adopt a managed float. In order to maintain the international equivalence of real rates 
of return on alternative assets, the nominal exchange rate must depreciate in line with the reductions 
in interest rates. Also the Central Bank must accumulate reserves in order to guarantee the 
credibility of its policy, to effectively intervene in the money market and to undertake foreign 
exchange operations in order to avoid interest rates hikes when there are unwarranted movements in 
the nominal exchange rate.
13 In addition and as the government through the Ministry o f  Finance ‘has ultimate responsibility for the conduct o f  monetary policy’ 
(W TO, 1996). The Bank of Jamaica implements monetary policy but under the authority of the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry
appoints the governor and some members o f  the board o f  directors. The Ministry o f Finance manages credit policy and open market 
and foreign exchange operations. Finally, the central bank is the banker o f  the government.
14
Jamaica’s efforts at controlling government expenditure have been reinforced through a wage freeze (incomes policy). The 
Memorandum o f Understanding (M OU) is an agreement signed between the government and the Jamaica Confederation o f  Trade 
Unions seeking to reduce the wage bill through a two-year policy o f  public employment and wage restraint effective 1  April 2004 
until 31 March 2006. A new Memorandum o f Understanding with the Jamaica Confederation o f  Trade Unions was signed in May 
2006. According to this agreement wage adjustment should not exceed 20 per cent plus an agreed provision o f the government’s 
wage bill for 2006-2008.
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Finally, this type of monetary policy which is eventually conducive to higher levels of 
economic growth is dependent on the compliance of announced fiscal targets. If the government 
cannot meet an announced fiscal target the stability of the currency may be undermined. This forces 
the monetary authorities to intervene in the foreign exchange market provided they have an 
adequate level of reserves. If the Central Bank does not have the required reserve level or if foreign 
exchange interventions prove to be too costly, then interest rate increases become the only option to 
maintain the stability of the currency. Higher interest rates compromise further the meeting of sound 
fiscal targets and, at the same time, have contractive effects on the economy.
B. The debt strategies: debt renegotiation
Caribbean countries have addressed debt reduction through two strategies: renegotiation, including 
debt restructuring and forgiveness and through an increase in the primary surplus. Both are 
ultimately unsuccessful as they fail to address the main problem, that is, the relationship between 
the fiscal stance and the export performance ratio. Guyana, Grenada and Belize provide failed 
attempts at debt renegotiation. 15
Guyana is one the beneficiaries of a recent initiative undertaken by the G-8 (London, 11 June 
2005), the Gleaneagles Proposal, to cancel the debt owed by 18 HIPC to the World Bank, the IMF 
and the African Development Bank.
As things stand, the G-8 initiative will result in a cancellation of debt amounting to US$283 
million US$65 million to the IMF and US$218 million to International Development Association 
(IDA). In addition, Trinidad and Tobago and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) Fund for International Development granted further debt relief US$123 million and US$5 
million) respectively. Trinidad and Tobago’s initiative is meant to assist with activities related to 
natural disaster recovery and rehabilitation.
15 There are other countries that have re-negotiated their debt. Antigua and Barbuda and Trinidad and Tobago are cases in point. 
Antigua and Barbuda renegotiated the terms and conditions of its high interest paying debt to domestic banks. The Antigua 
Government also managed to normalise gradually its relation with external creditors and to secure a significant debt write off with a 
European Creditor (Italy). As a result of the measures pursued by the government, the debt stock, which had been slashed by 50 per 
cent in 2004 experienced further reduction in 2005. Also in an effort to improve its debt management and to avoid continued increase 
in its debt stock, the government re-instituted the National Debt Co-ordinating Committee. In 2006, the government attempted to 
retire expensive obligation commitments and at the same time stimulate growth through the issue o f  three regional treasury bonds 
worth US$19 million. The treasury bills have a maturity date o f  91 days with a 6.5 per cent discount rate. For its part Trinidad and 
Tobago took advantage o f the favourable external environment to its oil industry to reduce its debt stock from 48 per cent to 41 per 
cent o f  GDP. The government refinanced its debt obligations denominated in domestic currency by issuing low yield bonds with a 
value o f  TT$800 million and a maturity o f 10 years. The government also repaid existing loans to the European Investment Bank and 
especially the Inter American Development Bank (IDB). In 2006, the government plans to continue reducing its debt stock by 
repaying one Eurobond and six bilateral and multilateral loans totalling $232 million. The government also expects to be debt free by 
the year 2030.
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The available data shows that Guyana has a positive net resource transfer (see table 5). Its net 
resource transfer was equivalent to 28 per cent of GDP in 2005. In so far as the Gleaneagles 
initiative provides debt relief by reducing the debt service ratio which is the smallest component of 
the Net Resource Transfer equation, the overall impact may not be very significant (see table 4).16
TABLE 4










2002 13.3 5.7 8.2 -2.3 6.0 4.3
2003 11.5 9.1 5.8 -3.6 3.5 3.3
2004 12.4 6.9 6.5 -2.0 3.8 2.8
2005 27.9 14.2 8.5 0.0 9.8 4.6
In 2005, Guyana’s debt stock increased despite the Central Bank’s efforts to mop the excess 
liquidity through the issuance of treasury bills bought mainly by the commercial banks. The total 
outstanding stock of treasury bills increased 4 per cent. As well, their maturity structure shifted 
towards longer-term maturities (79 per cent of the total). External debt operations did not register 
any significant changes other than small multilateral and bilateral disbursements. These include 
loans provided by the Peoples Republic of China to finance the modernization of the sugar sector 
and by India for the construction of a cricket stadium to host cricket World Cup games.
Grenada suspended payments on its external debt obligations at the end of 2004 due to the 
devastation caused by Hurricanes Ivan and Emily in September 2004 and 2005 (200 per cent and 12 
per cent of GDP). In September 2005, the authorities announced an offer to exchange new issued 
bonds denominated in foreign and local currency for the half of its external and domestic bonds, 
commercial loans and guaranteed debt. The new bonds offered have a 19-year maturity period (i.e., 
until 2025) and a step-up coupon rate structure from 1 per cent (2005 to 2008) to 9 per cent (2018 to 
2025). The interest payments began in March 2006.
Notwithstanding these efforts, the external debt stock increased. This is explained by the 
effects of additional multilateral loans and bilateral loans granted by the Government of Trinidad 
and Tobago. Also as a result of the debt restructuring operations, guaranteed government debt and 
capitalised interest rate charges were included as part of the outstanding debt stock.
16 Highly Poor Indebted Countries (HPIC) have received three debt relief initiatives. The first two focused on forgiving debt and 
providing a longer time frame for the repayment of the remainder debt. The Gleaneagles proposal focuses on the forgiveness of all 
debt owed to three multilateral agencies (the International M onetary Fund, the W orld Bank and the African Development Bank). This 
is equivalent to US$55 billion in the stock o f  debt and roughly less than $2 billion in debt service (which amounts to 0.01% o f the 
GDP of OECD economies.
The debt relief initiative is part o f  the instruments to achieve the millennium development goals. However, the debt relief initiative 
does little to improve growth or welfare prospects. According to Arslanalp and Henry (2006) this is due to the fact that it has an 
insignificant impact on the net resource transfer o f HIPC countries. The net resource transfer is equal to the sum o f new lending, 
grants, portfolio equity and foreign direct investment minus the debt service. HIPC countries have a small debt service (for HIPC 
countries it reaches 3 per cent on average. In the case o f  Guyana it is equal to roughly 1 per cent o f  GDP) and receive, according to 
these authors, capital flows that are close to 15 per cent o f GDP. That is, HIPC countries receive more capital than they pay out.
NRT = NL + Gr + PE+ FDI -  DS 
Where,
NRT = net resource transfer
NL = New lending
Gr = grants
PE = portfolio equity
FDI = foreign direct investment
DS = debt service
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Belize also increased its debt stock by placing in March 2005 two bonds in international 
capital markets worth US$137 million. However, due to its low levels of credit worthiness, the 
country was forced to incur charges and financing fees equivalent to 1 per cent of GDP. The fiscal 
situation has remained precarious and in August 2006, the authorities defaulted on their debt
17obligations payments (representing 27 per cent of the government’s fiscal revenue).
C. Debt strategies: the increase in the primary surplus
The second policy alternative, slashing government expenditure, is the preferred one by the 
mainstream economic literature. This policy alternative is instrumentalized through cuts in public 
employment and/or public works in order to expand the primary surplus. The government cannot 
directly control interest payments. It can control at most, and only partially, its domestic 
component.
As a result, the primary surplus is viewed as a signal of the commitment of the authorities to 
meet their financial obligations. In this way it has become a sign of a government’s solvency and a 
vehicle to influence agents’ perception of a country’s fiscal solvency. Larger primary fiscal 
surpluses lead to country risk upgrades and to lower risk premia.
In the case of the Caribbean the debt accounting exercises carried out by the IMF that 
champions this view shows that more than half of the increase in the public debt to GDP ratios is 
explained by the ‘deterioration of primary fiscal balances’ and 39 per cent is accounted for by the 
effects of interest payments and output growth.18 (see table 5)
If an economy-wide perspective is adopted, as proposed in this document, the contraction in 
government expenditure may not be able to reduce the debt stock. Indeed, the contraction in 
government expenditure can redress the fiscal imbalance but not necessarily close the current 
account gap.
The reduction in government expenditure can alter the relationship between the export 
performance and fiscal stance, such that the export performance exceeds the fiscal stance. However, 
it does not guarantee that this relationship will not change over time as changes in external demand, 
for example a reduction in external demand, can force the government to contract its expenditures 
further. In a situation such as that of the Caribbean, where export performance has continually 
deteriorated since 1992, the government would be forced to contract its expenditures on a continual 
basis, in order to avoid an increase in debt.
This can be shown through simulation scenarios for a highly indebted Caribbean economy 
using the model delineated in section 2 of this document. Following Godley and Cripps (1983) the 
model postulates a stock to flow ratio equal to 1; an average propensity to import equal to 0.80 and 
a tax to GDP ratio of 0.24. The model describes an economy that is characterized by a fiscal and 
current account deficit (i.e., the fiscal stance is greater than the export performance ratio).
17 See, Government o f  Belize. Belize announces impending debt arrangement.
18 See, Sahay (2004), p.8.
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TABLE 5
DEBT ACCOUNTING FOR SELECTED CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES
Total
Public
Primary Primary Events and
Year public debt fiscal fiscal Interest Output Price measure­
As % of accumu without With payments Growth effect mentGDP grants grants errors
Very highly indebted Caribbean Countries (average)
1991-1997 72.4 0.0 0.7 -0.9 3.2 -1.7 -1.6 1.0
1998-2003 123.3 8.5 4.5 2.7 5.4 -2.0 -1.2 3.7
Change 50.9 8.5 3.9 3.6 2.2 -0.3 0.4 2.7
Antigua and Barbuda
1991-1997 102.1 -1.7 -1.5 -1.9 7.2 -3.1 -2.8 -1.2
1 998-2003 114.3 2.0 4.0 3.4 4.5 -3.2 -1.2 -1.5
Change 12.2 3.8 5.5 5.3 -2.7 -0.1 1.6 -0.3
Belize
1991-1997 41.1 2.3 5.6 4.3 1.6 -1.3 -0.6 -1.7
1 998-2003 93.2 8.7
COCO 7.6 2.9 -4.2 0.1 2.3
Change 52.1 6.4 3.3 3.4 1.3 -2.9 0.7 4.0
Dominica
1991-1997 61.1 -1.1 4.7 0.7 2.3 -1.5 -2.3 -0.3
1 998-2003 122.0 10.1 8.2 3.5 4.6 0.8 -1.2 2.4
Change 60.9 11.2 3.4 2.9 2.3 2.2 1.0 2.8
Grenada
1991-1997 41.5 -2.1 3.5 0.6 2.4 -2.0 -0.2 -3.0
1 998-2003 108.5 11.2 7.5 4.0 3.1 -1.4 -1.5 7.0
Change 67.0 13.2 3.9 3.3 0.7 0.5 -1.3 -9.9
Jamaica
1991-1997 103.0 -2.2 -8.5 -8.5 3.0 0.0 -2.3 5.6
1 998-2003 142.0 6.5 -8.3 -8.3 11.8 -1.3 -0.5 4.8
Change 39.0 8.7 0.2 0.2
COCO -1.4 1.8 -0.8
St. Kitts and Nevis
1991-1997 85.6 4.5 0.1 -0.5 2.7 -2.4 -1.8 6.5
1 998-2003 159.7 12.3 6.9 5.9 5.3 -2.7 -3.2 7.0
Change 74.1 7.9 6.7 6.4 2.6 -0.3 -1.4 0.5
Source: Sahay (2004) p.24
Figure16 below shows the actual and simulated fiscal and current account imbalances and the 
simulated fiscal stance and export performance ratio for the period 1990 to 2005. The figure shows 
a deterioration of the actual fiscal and current account deficits from the year 2000 until 2005. The 
simulated series follow the trend of the actual ones. At the same time, the gap between the fiscal 
stance and the export performance ratio widens predicting an increase in the debt stock. The actual 
debt stock increases from 40 per cent to 80 per cent of GDP between 2000 and 2005.
Given this scenario, figure 17 shows the effects of a contraction in government expenditure 
on the fiscal deficit, the current account, the fiscal stance and export performance ratios and the debt 
stock. More precisely the model simulates the effects of a 10 per cent contraction in 1995 and a 
government expenditure freeze thereafter.
The simulation exercise shows that government expenditures decline from 35 per cent to 25 
per cent between 1990 and 2005. The fiscal deficit is significantly reduced and turns into a surplus
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(-13 per cent and 1 per cent of GDP in 1990 and 2005). The current account gap narrows but 
remains significant (35 per cent and 15 per cent of GDP for the same period). Finally the debt stock 
rises from 60 per cent to 90 per cent of GDP between the time of the cut in expenditures until the 
end of the period.
FIGURE16
ACTUAL AND SIMULATED SCENARIOS (USING A STOCK-FLOW MODEL)
FOR A SMALL CARIBBEAN ECONOMIES
(a) Current account actual and simulated (1990-2005)
Years
 CA Actual  CA Simulated
(b) Simulated Fiscal Stance and Export Performance Ratio 
(deviation from GDP)
Years
F S D E V  ----------
(c) Actual and simulated fiscal deficit as percentage of GDP
10.0 T
Years
Fiscal deficit S - - - - Fiscal deficit A
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(d) Fiscal stance and export performance rations (1990-2005)
Years
(e) Actual debt stock as percentage of GDP




SIMULATION OF A CONTRACTION IN GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE USING A STOCK-FLOW MODEL
(a) Government expenditure pre (G1/GDP) and post (g2/GDP) adjustment (b) Pre (CA1) and post (CA2) adjustment current account




(c) Fiscal result pre (FD1) and post (FD2) adjustment
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Years
(d) Pre (FS1/EPR1) and post adjustment (FS2/EPR2) fiscal stance to 
export performance ratios
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(e) Simulated path of external debt w ith adjustmen
Source: Author's own computations. They are the result of a model.
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V I .  C o n c l u s i o n
During the second half of the 1990s, Caribbean countries witnessed an 
unprecedented increase in their debt levels. Caribbean countries rank among 
the most indebted emerging market economies in the world.
The accumulation of debt beyond a certain point has a fundamental 
implication. It changes the role of institutions and of economic policy in a 
fundamental way. The management of the debt becomes the overriding 
focus of economic policy and institutions. Economic policy and 
institutions become in fact divorced from their roles in the development of 
real sector activity and turn their focus to the development of the financial 
sector.
The mainstream literature centers its analysis of the debt on two 
concepts the government budget constraint and ‘debt sustainability.’ 
According to this view, debt is a by product of government spending 
relative to its revenue. Leaving aside debt restructuring, the 
recommendation to reduce debt is to increase the primary surplus.
Looking solely at the government budget constraint provides no 
information about the rest of the agent’s constraints and can only provide 
an incomplete analysis. Moreover the analysis cannot explain the 
accumulation of debt which is a dynamic phenomenon unless it assumes 
that the government is always ‘over spending’ which is a simplistic 
explanation.
This document argues that the debt phenomenon should be 
analyzed from an economy-wide perspective. The approach taken is that 
of stock-flow models pioneered by W. Godley because of its transparency 
and because it provides a consistent picture of the economy. The approach 
requires that all constraints be consistent which is an important element 
missing from the mainstream approach.
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A consistent picture of an economy with five agents (consumers, firms, banks, government 
and the rest of the world) encapsulated in a transactions, flow-of-funds and accumulation matrices 
shows that the generation of debt and debt accumulation can occur if the fiscal stance is greater than 
the export performance ratio. As a result, debt is not a by-product of government overspending 
relative to its earnings. Rather, debt is the result of government spending relative to what the 
external sector allows. In other words, the real constraint of the government is not its ‘budget 
constraint’ but the constraint of the ‘external sector.’ Once governments are able to accumulate debt 
through a fiscal-external sector interaction (i.e., fiscal-external dynamics) the debt stock eventually 
becomes unsustainable.
The approach here followed recognizes an obvious fact. Caribbean economies are balanced- 
of-payments constrained. More precisely, as shown in this document, any attempt to reduce debt 
that does not take into account the relationship between the fiscal and the external accounts may 
simply fail. Debt restructuring operations and the contraction in government expenditures are two 
cases in point
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Annex 1
PUBLIC AND EXTERNAL DEBT IN THE OECS BY BORROWER CATEGORY




Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data.




Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data.
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Annex 2
Stabilization in the Caribbean: The cases of Barbados, Guyana 
and Trinidad and Tobago
Barbados adopted a stabilization plan to correct growing balance-of-payments and fiscal deficits. 
The twin deficits were partly a product of expansionary policies aiming at increasing the level of 
capital expenditure and of unfavorable external economic conditions.
Barbados’ resort to stabilization at the start of the 1980s and the 1990s was the result of a 
continued expansionary fiscal policy dating from the mid-1960s coupled with a decline in the 
economy’s key economic sector: tourism. The tourism sector is an important source of foreign 
exchange, of tax earnings and due to its linkages with the other sectors acts as a catalyst for their 
development.
Barbados’ expansionary fiscal policy led to a deficit that was mainly financed from domestic 
sources. However, by the end of the 1970s the government was borrowing on the external market. 
During this time the ratio of the total debt to national income increased from 32 per cent to 49 per 
cent. For its part, tourism saw an important decline in its activity as a consequence of a generalized 
decline in external demand (its earnings dropped in 1981 by 20 per cent below their 1979 level) 
which led to the widening of the current account deficit (Anyadike-Danes, 1996).
Thus Barbados found itself with twin deficits (fiscal and balance-of-payments deficits) at a 
time when the external debt crisis in developing countries exploded (see table 3). The consequent 
lack of finance led to a decline in reserves forcing the authorities to adopt an unsuccessful 
stabilization programme in 1982. The programme met with unchanging monetary and fiscal policies 
on the part of the government and with a world economic recession. In 1991 another stabilization 
package was adopted centered on restraining the growth of aggregate demand in order to reduce the 
pressure on the balance of payments. Demand was curbed by monetary and fiscal means.
Direct instruments (i.e., reserve requirements) of monetary management were adopted and 
interest rates were increased. On the fiscal expenditure side, nominal wages were cut and frozen and 
public employment reduced. On the revenue side a surtax termed the “stabilization tax” was 
introduced in addition to consumption taxes and levies and at the same time the authorities reduced 
the rate of CARICOM’s common external tariff. In 1997 the value-added tax was introduced. The 
authorities decided to maintain a pegged exchange rate regime sustained in part by capital controls 
on outflows (Hilaire, 2000; Williams, 2001).
Guyana’s stabilization history is similar to that of Nicaragua except that Guyana followed 
more closely the principles of a socialist regime. In 1970, the People’s National Congress declared 
Guyana a Cooperative Socialist Republic. This meant the control of the economy by the 
government. The guidelines for development included the nationalization of the means of 
production and distribution, including the sugar and bauxite industries, the adoption of a basic 
needs strategy (food, housing and clothing)19 and the subjugation of the financial system’s to the 
needs of the real sector. These guidelines were accompanied by controls on interest rates, and on 
import and foreign exchange transactions.
In the first stages the implementation of the government’s policies were facilitated by 
international high sugar prices softening in this way the external and fiscal constraints. However, 
the lack of export dynamism and the persistent granting of subsidies to finance public enterprises 
and the fiscal stance of the government helped to reduce reserves. According to Howard (1992) the 
net foreign reserves which peaked in 1975 (G$197 million) became negative throughout the 1980 
reaching G$-13 442 in 1989.
19 Thom as (1993), p.137.
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The economy experienced a period of recession and the attempts to redress the 
macroeconomic situation through fiscal restraint were thwarted by the second oil crisis (1979-1981) 
(Hilaire, 2000). The oil crisis provoked a rise in government expenditure not met by revenues 
causing the fiscal deficit to increase to unprecedented levels sending the external debt to an all time 
high. Other attempts at stabilization guided by the devaluation of the exchange rate were unable to 
improve the situation.
In 1987, the current account deficit represented 46 per cent of GDP, the public sector deficit 
reached 34 per cent of GDP, GDP growth was negative (-1.4 per cent), and the stock of external 
debt was 330 per cent of GDP (see table 1, below).
As in Nicaragua, at the beginning of the 1990s, the Guyanese authorities embarked on a 
stabilization programme, which consisted of monetary restraint accompanied by fiscal reform. 
Monetary restraint was based on direct instruments of monetary control such as increasing reserve 
requirements (9 per cent in 1991 and 16 per cent in 1994 and 12 per cent in 1999). The reserve 
requirement conditions were extended to include all depository institutions (Ganga, 2000).
The nature of the fiscal reform was colored by the extent of the country’s external 
indebtedness. The reform consisted of the reduction of government expenditure and increases in 
taxes. Public employment was reduced (the civil service was reduced by one half between 1991 and 
1998), State-owned assets were sold to finance fiscal operations, the tax base was widened to 
include public firms, the tax structure simplified and the consumption tax introduced.
The monetary and fiscal stabilization was complemented with commercial and financial 
liberalization. The CARICOM external tariff rates were reduced as well as import quotas and 
import surcharges were applied on a temporary basis. In the financial front, measures included 
removing restrictions on interest rates, credit and foreign exchange transactions. Financial 
liberalization measures were also accompanied by measures to strengthen financial supervision20 
(Ganga, 1997 and 2000).
In line with these developments, exchange controls were removed (1991), the exchange rate 
regime progressed from a pegged based to a flexible exchange rate regime and capital controls were 
abolished in 1996.
Trinidad and Tobago’s economy is largely dependent on the fortunes of oil. Oil not only 
provides foreign exchange and capital to satisfy import consumption and the requirements of 
domestic investment, but is also an important source of fiscal revenue and distribution to other 
sectors of the economy. Foreign companies’ exports of oil, which represent in part ex-ante surplus 
earnings, are taxed financing the State’s activities in other areas of economic activities. Oil is a 
linkage between the balance of payments and the fiscal accounts and between the petroleum sector 
and the other productive and distribution sectors. The oil sector is currently in decline although it 
still represented 26 per cent of GDP in 2001. The authorities are turning to natural gas to substitute 
oil as the motor of the economy.
The oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 increased the price of crude oil improving the terms of trade 
for Trinidad and Tobago. The net barter terms of trade increased from 154 in 1973 to 223 in 1981 
(Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago, 1998). The favorable movement of the terms of trade 
strengthened the position of the oil-producing sector in GDP. In 1970 the petroleum industry 
represented 21 per cent of GDP, 46 per cent in 1975 following the first oil shock and 36 per cent in 
1981 following the second oil shock. At the same time these events led to a favorable position in 
the balance of payments. The value of exports increased and so did its volume due to the fact that 
petroleum has a low price elasticity of demand. In addition, a profitable activity such as petroleum
20 In 1995, the Financial Institutions Act was enacted. The Act enables the Central Bank to be the ultimate supervisory institution. A 
similar arrangement was implemented in the Dominican Republic following its structural adjustment programme in 1990.
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attracted capital inflows. These factors facilitated the accumulation of international reserves. 
Finally, the oil-price hike led to an increase in the government’s revenue.
When prices collapsed in 1981-1988, the value of exports declined (due to both a decrease in 
its price and its quantity), capital inflows exhibited a downward tendency and government revenues 
were also negatively affected. As a result reserves declined. The economy was faced with a double 
constraint: balance-of-payments and fiscal constraints. Both effects had a negative impact on 
growth that was compounded by the linkage between oil and domestic investment (see table 2).
The drain in foreign exchange reserves forced the government to adopt a stabilization 
package21. The aims of the programme included a devaluation (the TT dollar was devalued from 
TT$ 3.60 to TT$ 4.25 per dollar on August 1988) and monetary and fiscal restraint and the 
management of liquidity through direct instruments, i.e., high reserve requirements. The programme 
established ceilings on the net domestic assets of the central bank. The programme contemplated the 
decrease in the budget deficit from 7 per cent of GDP in 1988 to 4 per cent in 1989 and 1 per cent in 
1991. The deficit was reduced first by reducing capital expenditures and then by the decline in 
current expenditures (i.e., the wage bill). Public wages and employment were reduced.22 On the 
revenue side public assets were sold to the private sector and tariffs were increased.23 The tax 
system was simplified, and the value -added tax was introduced to replace an array of different 
taxes.24 Finally, credit ceilings were imposed on the borrowing requirements of the public sector.
Trade liberalization measures included the decrease in the common external tariff rates and 
reduction in import restrictions. As in the case of Guyana, temporary imports surcharges were also 
applied. Export diversification measures were encouraged to widen the productive base and develop 
non-oil exports. In line with this framework the exchange rate was progressively liberalized to reach 
a floating exchange rate regime and the capital account of the balance of payments liberalized in 
1993.
21 In practice the government adopted two successive stabilization packages in 1989 and 1990. For expository purposes this section 
refers to the stabilization package, which encompasses both 1989 and 1990 programmes.
22 Public wages were reduced by 10% (Howard, 1992 and Hilaire, 2000).
23 According to Howard, ibid, p. 77: “transfers to public utilities, state enterprises, and statutory bodies was reduced by 0.5% of 
G D P.. .state enterprises were reduced by 1100 employees in 1989...as it was estimated that the would be a further reduction o f  3 200 
employees in 1990.”
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